By
Donald H. Harrison
Richard Perle served as assistant secretary of Defense for strategic
affairs during Ronald Reaganıs administration. As a private citizen, he
chairs a policy advisory board for the U.S. Department of Defense. Heritage
editor-in-chief Donald H. Harrison interviewed him at the La Jolla Torrey
Pines Hilton on Tuesday, Dec. 3, prior to Perleıs speech at a United Jewish
Federation dinner for major donors. A transcript follows
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Harrison: There really are two questions I
wanted to get into with you. The first is Iraq
and Israel, and what you
foresee is the role that Israel can or should play, and what the United States
would expect of Israel, if there is a war. And the second area I would like to
discuss with you is your views on the current administration and its feelings
toward the Jewish community and its issues. So, let's start with Iraq. Last
time (in the Gulf War of 1991), Israel had to sit by and receive a few Scuds
so there wouldnıt be an alliance broken up. What do you see this time if it
does come to war?
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Richard Perle
Herb Targum photo |
Perle: In 1991, Saddam fired
30-something Scud missiles at Israel and no one died as a result. One person
suffered a heart attack in the midst of a missile landing very near his
apartment, but there were no fatalities directly attributed to that, so it was
relatively easy for Israel not to
take an action against Saddam. And I think they were persuaded that if they did
so, they ran the risk of at least changing the political character of the war. I
believe that was overemphasized. It may not have been a significant risk at that
point in the conduct of the war; the coalition had
enough momentum to see things through to conclusion. So I donıt think it was
crucial that Israel chose not to respond, but it would not have made much sense
for Israel to respond given the ineffectiveness of the Iraqi attacks. This time,
of course, the great concern is that he will again use Scud missiles, but with
chemical warheads, even biological warheads. And clearly
if he were to inflict a large number of casualties in Israel, then the Israeli
government like any other government would feel compelled to respond. Where the
diplomatic subtlety comes into this equation is discouraging Saddam from making
that attack in the first place on the grounds that
whereas it might not be militarily effective, it could affect the politics of
the war in progress.
So I think the Israelis are right to remain largely silent about what they would
do, not to engage in any public discussion about the ranges of options available
to them. I have no doubt that Saddam understands that if he inflicts significant
casualties in Israel, Israel will inflict significant
casualties on Saddam. While I am skeptical of "deterrence" as a means
of controlling Saddam Hussein, I think the Israelis can almost certainly deter
using weapons of mass destruction.
Q: As this plays out, Saddam firing missiles at Israel, he's calculating
that the rest of the Arab world will then see this as "us versus the Jews
of Israel." How sophisticated an analysis is that on his part?
A: I donıt think it is terribly sophisticated, to tell you the truth. It
rests on the simple notion that other countries can't figure out where their own
interests lie in relationship to an event as significant as a war in the
neighborhood. And I think the other countries are pretty good at
understanding where their interests lie. So the question is, will they go off in
some emotional, irrational tangent because Israel has responded to an attack on
Israel, and I am not at all sure that is true. I know that is the standard
thinking. It would be so transparent that it is hard to believe
that it would have a really significant effect.
Q: And that was your thinking concerning 1991?
A: Yes, that was pretty much what I thought in 1991, but as there was
little that Israel could contribute to the overall war effort at the point at
which the Scud missiles were fired, the Israelis probably did the right thing.
There will be potentially similar questions this time—that is, what could
Israel do to hasten Saddam's demise that the United States would not already
be doing? And it is not obvious to me that Israel will have a lot to contribute
there. Israel certainly has the right to deter an attack on itself by making it
clear that it will respond.
Q: What did the Allies do in 1991? I suppose at some point you could say
that everybody else was redundant with a superpower opposing Iraq.
A: I think by the time the ground
forces went in, the war was essentially over. So much damage had been done from
the air that there was little resistance. Popular resistance here and there. You
had Iraqi units surrendering to journalists—I have lived in Washington where
everybody
surrenders to journalists; it is not demeaning to surrender to journalists. But,
seriously, Iraq is no match for the United States. We don't need a lot of help
in order to deal effectively with Saddam. We donıt need anything like the
coalition that was necessary in 1991, because in 1991 we mobilized a massive
force that required massive logistical support, bases from which to operate,
ports into which the flow of materiel could be sustained and so forth. Any
action this time would be much smaller in scale but even more effective because
we are much better at it than we were.
Q: Do you see some scenario, some understanding, developing between the
United States and Israel concerning the "what ifs" of this situation—
what if they fire a missile at Israel, and Israel decides to respond; how can it
respond without endangering U.S. troops or efforts? Is there, to your knowledge,
some sort of understanding?
A: Yes, I donıt know about the planning details, but I would think it
would make sense for both countries to have thought this through and discussed
it, so that decisions don't have to be made in real time without some
background.
Q: Even in your advisory role with the Defense Department, you are not
absolutely certain this is already in place?
A: No, I havenıt asked what planning has been done there. By and large,
for my own reasons, I have avoided getting into what the President plans because
I am out speaking all the time about Iraq. It is better that I not be current on
operational plans.
Q: What is your overall theory about what is likely to happen? Do you see
war as being inevitable at this point?
A: War is never inevitable. On the other hand, it seems likely that
Saddam will continue the pattern of recent years, which is not cooperating,
certainly not giving up the weapons of mass destruction that he has already
accumulated in his efforts to acquire more of them. And President Bush has made
it pretty clear that either he disarms totally or he will be disarmed.
Q: Do you think the United States is also prepared to win the peace and
stay in there?
A: I do. The attitude that has sometimes existed in the past, that we
don't want to be involved in nation-building—we should, when we do use
military forces, go in and out as quickly as possible — I think that kind of
simple notion has given way to more sophisticated feeling for what it takes to
secure American interests. It would not be a success if we left prematurely
before there was stability and then saw the whole thing collapse.
Q: Do you see a model like Germany or Japan after World War II, or maybe
what has occurred in Afghanistan?
A: There is a lot of talk about this and somebody was saying the other
day that he thought Italy was the better model. When we went into Italy,
(Benito) Mussolini was hanging from a lamp post. We stayed for a little while.
We brought some stability into the place. We helped the Italians get things
sorted out and then we left. It was neither a Japanese occupation,
with (Gen. Douglas) MacArthur essentially rewriting the Japanese constitution,
or a German occupation, with John McCloy serving effectively as the— well,
"proconsul" doesnıt quite do justice to the job he did after the war.
None of these models can be picked up and imposed without modification. The
Italian one, because it was a gentle administration until Italian politics
could begin to function, as least as well as it does, that might be the model. I
am more optimistic than many people about the ability of the Iraqis to put
together a decent alternative to Saddam Hussein.
Q: Let's move on to Topic B, the relations of the Bush administration
with the Jewish community.
A: I think this administration has been terrific with respect to the
Jewish community and Israel in particular. I know there were a lot of
misgivings, some memories of the first President Bush and some policies from
that administration, particularly what amounted to a lot of pressure on Israel
and the fears that something like that would happen again. It hasn't happened.
On the contrary, President Bush is strongly supportive of Israel's efforts to
deal with terrorism. It is despite the enormous pressure on the President to put
pressure on Israel. He has not done that. He has nudged them occasionally, but
nothing that could be described as real pressure. In fact, the people who have
been complaining that they have been pressured are the Palestinians, and (Yassir)
Arafat in particular. So I think Bush has really been terrific, and I think it
flows from conviction. It flows from a genuine affection for Israel, and I think
that is something to do with his
own faith. So I hope that— although I am not so optimistic— I hope that the
Jewish community will recognize that and give him a reasonable degree of support
in the next election. That is very hard to get much above 25 percent if you are
a Republican.
Q: Why are father and son so different in this regard?
A: I think they are entirely different people. The father grew up in
Kennebunkport (Maine) and George W. grew up in Texas, so that is a pretty big
difference right away. They are entirely different personalities. I knew Vice
President Bush when I served in the Reagan administration, when he was Vice
President, and I had some occasional contact with him as President. I was
involved in the (George W.) Bush campaign early on, so I was down in Texas,
participated in some meetings with him. He is tough-minded; he cuts right to the
heart of an issue, and the idea that he isnıt smart, I don't understand that.
He is very smart.
Q: Perhaps because he struggles with his grammar?
A: Well, it is true there is a tendency to associate a certain rhetorical
style with intelligence, but it's a big mistake. People have strengths in
different things. You donıt go to Yale undergraduate and get an MBA at Harvard
if you are a dummy. And the fools that say "well, that just shows
you can buy your way in," well, thatıs rubbish. He is a very smart guy. I
watched him in situations where he was being asked to absorb a lot of material,
much of it new, and he is like a sponge.
Q: You mentioned that part of his affection for Israel is his faith. A
local controversy has been how to relate to the Evangelical Christian community,
whom some credit as being very important to shaping the administration's policy
toward Israel. What is your take on evangelical Christians, the Christian Right,
George Bush and Israel?
A: I think the Christian Right — I am not sure exactly what is meant by
that— but they and evangelical Christians are not necessarily the same thing.
The evangelicals take a view of the Bible and biblical truth that produces an
affinity with Israel. It is a very welcome development. They are the only
natural defenders of Israel with the Jewish community. The politics would be
quite different (without them). The evangelicals make an enormous difference. So
I think that kind of support should be welcomed. It is genuine, it is heartfelt,
it doesn't come with strings attached. We should be grateful for it. You donıt
have to support the social ideas of the Christian Right in order to receive
gratefully whatever support is offered by the evangelicals, or even by Christian
conservatives. You donıt have to buy ... their views.
Q: You can be pro-choice and still have an ally concerning Israel?
A: I have no problem, none at all. I come from Washington, where you make
alliances all the time. You can't be so rigid that you say I can't agree with
anyone unless they agree with everything. That certainly isn't a key to success.
Youıve got to, on some issues, ally with them, and other issues you oppose. So
yes, you can be pro-choice and welcome the support of them on Israel.
Q: I see weıre being signaled concerning the time. Is there something
you
would like to add to this interview?
A: I do think that the removal of Saddam has the potential to usher in a
period in the region of much greater promise. Things are terrible between Israel
and the Palestinians. I don't see any prospect that they will get better any
time soon. They certainly wonıt get better under Arafat.
Saddam Hussein has been encouraging resistance to any movement toward a peaceful
resolution. He has been sending checks to the families of suicide bombers— in
effect rewarding suicide bombers— and his removal I think would be a
tremendous encouragement to people throughout the region who are suffering under
dictatorships. They will have seen the most brutal of all
the dictators fall, and I think it would be a signal for movement in a more
democratic direction over the long term.
Q: Thank you very much.
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